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Introduction 
Knowledge of the cost structure and production technology of 
financial institutions is essential for analyzing institutional 
performance and assessing the adequacy of financial policies. 
Bank managers need to carefully monitor cost indicators in order 
to evaluate the performance of their institution over time and in 
comparison to their competitors, and to assess the profitability 
of different bank services. Managerial decisions about expansion 
or contraction of bank activities, as· well as the provision of 
new financial services, must be based on the knowledge of 
specific features of bank technology such as economies of scale 
and economies of scope. 
Policy-makers, on the other hand, should consider the cost 
structure and technological parameters of financial institutions 
when deciding on policy measures that affect the financial 
system. The effects of reserve requirements, interest-rate 
ceilings, and branching regulations, among other policies, are 
conditioned by the ability of banking firms to adjust their 
operational procedures and resource allocation to the policy 
measures. More than one bank failure can be traced to inadequate 
policies that have either under-estimated the costs of providing 
certain financial services, or over-estimated the market 
potential of specific areas of activity. 
Several studies have addressed the measurement of scale 
economies and cost complementarities in the production of 
financial services in developed economies (Benston, Hanweck and 
Humphrey; Hunter and Timme; Mullineaux; Murray and White; Panzar 
and Willig). Until recently, however, few studies had focused on 
the cost-output relationships of financial institutions operating 
in developing countries. 
This paper reviews a number of recent studies on the costs 
of financial intermediation in developing economies. The 
countries included in the study are Bangladesh and the Philip-
pines in Asia, Honduras and the Dominican Republic in Latin 
America, and Niger and Togo in West Africa. Since interest rates 
vary substantially across countries due to different monetary 
scenarios, the comparative analysis presented here focuses on the 
non-financial costs incurred by financial institutions in these 
countries. 
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The following section presents a conceptual framework common 
to most studies reviewed, highlighting the main components of the 
cost structure of financial intermediaries, and the factors 
likely to affect the level and behavior of these costs. 
Subsequently, the different methods used in the country case 
studies are summarized, before presenting the empirical results 
involving about fifty banks in the six developing countries 
indicated above. These results are discussed in two separate 
sections. First, economies of scale and economies of scope 
results, along with the costs of lending and deposit 
mobilization, are analyzed for a subset of the case studies where 
these estimates were obtained. Secondly, the analysis focuses on 
the costs of lending in all case studies, and on the importance 
of assessing risk premia before judging the relative performance 
of financial institutions. Some concluding remarks follow. 
Transaction Costs of Financial Intermediation 
Financial transactions entail non-financial costs for all 
participants in the market, i.e., depositors, borrowers, and 
financial intermediaries. The level and distribution of these 
costs among the participants are affected by changes in 
technology, by changes in consumer preferences and by financial 
regulations. 
Depositors incur search and information costs to select a 
depository institution, and to perform account transactions 
(deposits, withdrawals). At the other end, borrowers bear 
explicit and implicit costs of negotiating, obtaining and 
repaying loans. For depositors and borrowers, the opportunity 
cost of time is likely to be a significant component of their 
transaction costsl. 
Non-financial transaction costs incurred by financial 
intermediaries may be classified into: (1), costs of mobilizing 
deposits and (2), costs of lending. The former correspond to 
resources (labor, capital, materials) utilized in handling 
deposits accounts, documentation, record-keeping, and issuing 
statements. Costs of lending refer to costs associated with loan 
processing, loan disbursement, monitoring, and loan recovery. 
Gathering information about potential borrowers, assessment of 
collateral and documentation are among these lending costs. 
In addition to the (explicit) resource costs of lending, 
important consideration should be given to risk costs, i.e., the 
implicit costs and explicit losses associated with loan default. 
Almost without exception, accounting provisions for loan delin-
1 Transaction costs of borrowing are dealt with in Cuevas 
(1988b). 
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quency are unrealistic, and follow diverse and usually un-
disclosed procedures. This introduces serious difficulties into 
cost and performance comparisons across banks. An attempt to 
overcome these complexities is made later in this paper. 
In summary, financial intermediaries are considered firms 
which use inputs of real resources to produce financial services 
(e.g., bookkeeping, loan evaluations, and deposit transactions), 
given a certain technology. Under this approach, financial 
assets as well as bank liabilities are considered bank outputs, 
to the extent that their production cause operating expenses. 
The treatment of deposits as a bank ·output is consistent with the 
"real resource model" approach to modelling the banking firm 
(Baltensperger), and it has been accepted practice in recent 
empirical work (Benston, Hanweck, and Humphrey; Benston, Berger, 
Hanweck, and Humphrey; Cuevas; Hunter. and Timme; Srinivasan). 
Methods 
The methods used in generating the results reported here 
fall into two categories: (i) econometric analysis of the cost 
function using pooled time series/cross-sectional data 
(Bangladesh, Honduras, the Dominican Republic); and (ii), cost-
allocation exercises using accounting data for a given time 
period (the Philippines, Honduras, Niger and Togo). Both methods 
are consistent with a constrained cost-minimization framework, 
while differing in the assumptions regarding the underlying 
technology of production. A summary discussion of the two 
methods follows. 
The Cost-Function (Econometric) Approach 
The cost-function (econometric) approach uses the duality 
relationships between cost and production functions (Varian) to 
infer properties of the production technology from the knowledge 
of the cost function. Thus, this approach allows the estimation 
of parameters such as economies of scale and economies of joint 
production (scope), without making prior assumptions about the 
nature of the underlying production function. Also, the method 
allows assessing the statistical significance of most indicators. 
The analytical advantages of this method are partially offset by 
its data requirements. A sufficient number of observations is 
required to allow enough degrees of freedom in the estimation. 
Moreover, even though it does not necessarily involve field 
(branch-level) work, the method does depend on the quality of the 
information available in financial statements and other bank 
records. -
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The general form of the cost function derived from a 
technology-constrained cost minimization can be written as 
follows: 
(1) 
where, C denotes resource costs involved in financial 
intermediation, qi is quantity of the ith output, psujchisapsrice of 
the jth input, and ~ summarizes control variables 
regulation indicators and loan-delinquency, which differ across 
different studies. 
Several issues are important in evaluating the cost 
function. Two of them will be discussed below: specification, 
and output definition. Srinivasan and Meyer address the question 
of the definition of the cost variable in a separate paper. Two 
other issues, the components of the ~·vector and estimation 
procedures, will be briefly referred to when presenting the 
empirical results. 
Specification and Properties of the Cost Function 
Earlier studies of bank costs in developing countries 
(Gheen; Nyanin) have provided limited insights into the cost 
structure and underlying technology of these institutions, due to 
the choice of very restrictive functional forms for the cost 
function. In general, the use of Cobb-Douglas or CES 
specifications implies the adoption of highly restrictive 
assumptions about the technology utilized by financial 
intermediaries. Under these specifications, scale economies are 
forced to remain constant, regardless of the level of output. 
Thus the corresponding average cost curves are either downward or 
upward sloping throughout the entire output domain. 
The recent studies reviewed here use the translogarithmic 
(translog) specification. The translog is a flexible functional 
form which has been found superior to other flexible forms in 
representing multiproduct cost functions (Caves, Christiansen, 
and Tretheway). Furthermore, attempts to overcome the 
limitations of the translog when there are zero output levels 
(e.g., Box-Cox transformation) result in cumbersome expressions 
which substantially reduce the analytical usefulness of the cost 
function (Chavez, Srinivasan). 
The translog cost function is essentially a second-order 
approximation to an arbitrary cost function. For two outputs and 
two inputs, the translog function is written as follows2: 
2 The following discussion of the translog function and 
its properties relies upon Cuevas (1988a). 
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lnC 1 2 1 2 a0 + a1 lnq1 + a2 lnq2 + ~1 lnp1 + ~2 lnp2 + ~ r 11 (lnq1 ) + ~ r 22 (lnq2 ) 
1 2 1 2 
+ 7 12lnqllnq2 + 2 ~ll(lnpl) + 2 °22(lnp2) + 0 12lnpllnp2 + 
(2) 
where, ql represents loans, q 2 represents deposits, p 1 denotes 
salaries and wages, and p 2 represents the price of capital 
services. 
The cost-share equations for the two inputs are derived from 
equation (2) as: 
+ L·77· .lnq., 
1 lJ 1 
j,h = 1,2, i l, 2. ( 3) 
where Sj denotes the cost share of input j. 
Cost function (2) should be homogenous of degree one in 
input prices. This condition imposes a set of restrictions on 
the parameters of equation (2) that is also consistent with the 
requirement that the sum of the cost shares (3) must equal one: 
0, j,h = 1,2, i = 1,2. 
Several properties of the cost structure and the underlying 
production function can be investigated using the translog cost 
function defined in equation (2). These properties are 
summarized as follows. 
Overall economies of scale, ES, are defined as the 
percentage change in cost when all outputs increase by a common 
factor, A. In equation (2), scale economies are measured as: 
ES a1nc 
ainq1 
that is, 
+ 
ES a 1 + a 2 + r 11lnq1 + r 22lnq2 + r 12 (lnq1 + lnq2 ) + 
+ ( 71 11 + 71 21) lnpl + (7/12 + 71 22) lnp2. (4) 
Scale economies are a function of the output levels, q 1 and 
q 2 ; therefore the ES measure is not invariant to scale and is 
dependent on the output mix. If ES is less than 1, economies of 
scale exist since costs increase proportionately less than 
output. Values of ES equal to or greater than 1 imply constant 
returns or diseconomies of scale, respectively. Partial 
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economies of scale, ESi, and marginal costs of each output, Mei, 
can be computed from equation (2) as: 
a1nc ci 
ES. al ' and MC. = -- (ES.) ( 5) 
i nq. i q. i 
l l 
where Ci is the proportion of total costs C attributed to output 
i. A discussion of the cost-attribution problem under joint 
production is found in Cuevas (1984). 
Cost complementarities (economies of scope) exist in multi-
output production when the marginal cost of producing one output 
declines with increases in production of another output (Murray 
and White; Panzar and Willig, 1981}. In terms of the parameters 
of the cost function (2), Murray and White indicate that a 
necessary condition for cost complementarity between loans and 
deposits is: · 
(6) 
For elasticity of substitution and elasticities of input demand, 
Uzawa has shown that the Allen partial elasticity of substitution 
between factors of production, ajh• can be written in terms of 
the (dual) cost function as: 
( ~=!~~ / alnc a1nc) ( 7 ) aJ.h = a a a a--- + l. pj Ph pj Ph 
In terms of the parameters of the translog cost function (2) 
and the factor shares (Sj), the Allen partial elasticities of 
substitution are computea as: 
ajh = (ojh + sjsh) I sjsh 
j,h = 1,2 
a .. JJ ( o . . + s . ( s . - 1 ) ) I s~ JJ J J J 
(8) 
In addition, the price elasticities of demand for inputs, ejh• 
are obtained using the estimated values of aij and the factor 
shares (see Binswanger). 
j,h = 1,2 (9) 
It is clear from (7) that if all ojh = o, then the 
elasticities of substitution are independent of factor prices, 
and equal to one for j ~ h. Furthermore, if all rik = o, ojh = 
0, and ~ij = 0, the cost function (1) reduces to a Cobb-Douglas-
type cost function: 
(10) 
with scale economies equal to (a 1 + a 2 ) and unitary elasticity of 
substitution. 
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Definition and-Measurement of Output 
Output definition has been a matter of concern in cost 
studies of financial institutions. Recent research, however, 
suggests that the scale economies results are invariant to the 
definition of out~ut (Benston, Hanwek, and Humphrey; Cuevas; 
Hunter and Timme) . The discussion has centered on determining 
the nature of the financial services provided by financial 
intermediaries, and the extent to which these services entail the 
use of real resources, i.e., generate value-added in the 
institution. 
The use of flow versus stock measures is at the same time a 
conceptual and a practical issue. For example, measuring loans 
as the flow (number or value) of loan contracts issued during the 
year would be the preferred measure of loan output, under the 
assumption that old loans outstanding in the portfolio do not 
generate value-added (i.e., do not require the use of bank 
resources). On the other hand, the use of deposit balances, or 
the number of deposit accounts existing at the end of the period 
is normally the only option available to the researcher, given 
the nature of the bank records usually available. However, this 
stock measure does not capture the "intensity" or "velocity" with 
which accounts are used, i.e., the number of transactions 
performed in a period of time, indeed the source of operating 
expenses for the institution. 
The studies reviewed here have used two output definitions: 
(i) number of loans, and number of deposit accounts, and (ii), 
value of loans, and value of deposit balances. Outputs have been 
measured primarily as stocks, under the assumption that the flow 
of services is proportional to the stock, as well as under the 
constraints of data availability. 
The heterogeneity of loans and deposit accounts have been 
recognized by introducing average loan-size and average deposit-
size as control variables in the estimation. It can be assumed 
that, everything else constant, lenders perceive large loans as 
riskier ventures, hence it is hypothesized that the marginal cost 
of a loan is an increasing function of loan size. However, the 
increase in marginal cost is expected to be less than 
proportional to the increase in loan size, thus making the 
marginal cost per dollar lent a decreasing function of loan size. 
On the other hand, large deposit accounts are assumed associated 
with "preferred" customers who receive special or additional 
services thus representing higher costs for the financial 
intermediary. It is expected, therefore, that the mar~inal cost 
3 Economies of scale and other cost indicators appear to 
be significantly sensitive to the definition of the 
cost variable (Srinivasan and Meyer). 
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of handling deposit accounts increases as deposit-size increases, 
while the marginal cost per dollar mobilized decrease with 
increases in the average deposit balance. 
The Cost-Allocation Method 
The cost-allocation method involves the (implicit) 
assumption of a fixed-coefficient production function, an 
important contrast with the cost-function (econometric) approach 
described above. As a consequence, returns to scale are constant 
by assumption throughout the entire output domain, and most 
technology indicators are pre-determined under the cost-
allocation method. 
The major data inputs required by the cost-allocation method 
are the financial statements for a sample of bank branches in a 
given time period (e.g., the most recent year), salary and wages 
of branch personnel, loans and deposits statistics for each 
branch for the corresponding time period, and the time allocation 
of bank employees. The latter, a key input in this method, is 
obtained from field interviews with branch personnel. 
The basic assumption of the cost-allocation method is that, 
with a few exceptions, non-personnel inputs in the production of 
banking services are allocated to different activities in the 
same proportions that personnel costs are. This method usually 
allows the researcher to obtain a very detailed breakdown of the 
resource allocation in the institution. For example, through an 
appropriate questionnaire design, it is possible to determine the 
relative importance of loan evaluation, loan monitoring, and loan 
recovery activities, within the general classification of lending 
activities. A similar degree of detail can be acquired in the 
description of funds mobilization activities. 
Since it involves field interviews, the cost-allocation 
method is necessarily restricted to a rather small sample of bank 
branches, thus limiting the statistical testing of results. On 
the other hand, it gives the researcher a better understanding of 
the activities and procedures performed by the institutions, than 
that obtained based solely on secondary data. 
Cross-Country Comparisons of Cost Estimates 
Several factors need to be considered in cross-country 
comparisons of bank costs. Two of these factors are highlighted 
here. First, the country's level (stage) of development 
determines to a great extent the degree of development and 
maturity of the financial system. It conditions the financial 
technologies available and/or applicable to the financial 
institutions. The stage of development of communications and 
infrastructure has an important impact on the costs associated 
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with bank procedures, and defines the constraints under which the 
system must operate. In other words, the "degree of sophistica-
tion" of the financial system is closely related to the country's 
overall development position. 
Second, the nature and extent of financial regulations 
affect intermediation costs in several ways. The availability, 
characteristics, terms and conditions, and effective rates of 
return of financial instruments are greatly determined by 
existing financial regulations, and by the ability and willing-
ness of the monetary authority to enforce them. Different types 
and strengths of financial regulations, along with differences in 
the country's overall monetary policy, are reflected in the 
degree of development of the financial system. 
The countries included in the ca~e studies analyzed here 
vary in their level of economic development from US$144 per 
capita in Bangladesh to US$790 per capita in Honduras (see 
Appendix Table). Honduras also shows the highest level of 
financial development as measured by the ratio of M2 over GDP, 
the lowest being that of Niger. Bank density is extremely low in 
Niger where there is one bank branch for every 250 thousand 
inhabitants, while the highest bank density corresponds to the 
Dominican Republic with one branch per seven thousand 
inhabitants. 
This section presents first a review of the technology 
parameters, cost structure and cost indicators estimated in 
econometric studies. 4 The effects of regulations and other 
factors included in different studies will be briefly addressed 
in this first part. Second, the costs of lending estimated or 
calculated in all case studies reviewed in this paper will be 
presented and discussed. Emphasis is placed on the costs of 
agricultural loans in the different countries involved. Finally, 
the key consideration of loan-recovery performance and default 
risk in assessing bank performance and viability is highlighted. 
In spite of the differences in methods and data bases, the 
results discussed below use comparable definitions of the cost 
and output variables, and of the relevant cost indicators. When 
necessary, adjustments have been made to assure the validity of 
the comparisons presented. 
4 Most of these parameters, as indicated above, are pre-
determined by the assumptions underlying the cost-
allocation approach. 
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9os~_Structure, Economies of Scale, Cost Complementarities and 
Other Parameters 
The econometric studies discussed here correspond to five 
Banks in Bangladesh (Srinivasan}5, two banks in Honduras (Cuevas, 
1984}, and one bank in the Dominican Republic (Cuevas and Poyo, 
1986b}. All of these studies use the translog cost function, 
define the cost variable as total non-interest operating 
expenses, and measure outputs as value of loans and value of 
outstanding deposit balances. Furthermore, all of them rely upon 
time-series/cross-sectional branch-level data. In all cases, the 
estimation of the cost function was undertaken as a cost system 
with the labor-share equation, using Zellner's seemingly 
unrelated iterative procedure. The cost-function estimates 
obtained for Mexico by Chavez, using a translog function, are not 
included in this review since they are based in bank-level data. 
Likewise, Camacho's study of Honduras banks is omitted given its 
differences in approach (profit-function}, and data base (bank-
level} with the other studies presented in this paper. 
Estimates of overall economies of scale (ES), partial 
economies of scale to the expansion of loans or deposits, and the 
cost shares of these two bank outputs are summarized in Table 1 
for the eight banks referred to above. All estimated parameters 
were evaluated at the geometric mean of all the variables in the 
cost equation. Hence, they represent the parameters for the 
"average branch", i.e. a hypothetical branch described by the 
geometric means of all variables. 
Three banks show important overall economies of scale in 
Table 1, most notably the public development bank of the 
Dominican Republic. These banks would therefore substantially 
benefit from an expansion in both lending and deposit activities. 
In all other cases, excepting Janata Bank in Bangladesh, the 
overall ES estimate is not significantly different from one 6 , 
i.e., their technology displays constant returns to scale at the 
average branch size. It m~st be recalled however, that the ES 
measure is not independent of scale effects and output mix 
(equation (4)). In all cases reported here, the ES value will 
increase as loans and deposits expand (i.e., the rii parameters 
5 
6 
The results discussed here for Bangladesh banks are 
somewhat different from those reported in Srinivasan 
and Meyer, since they correspond to an specific 
combination of cost variable/output metric definition, 
consistent with that used in the other studies. My 
appreciation to Aruna Srinivasan for making these 
results available to me. 
The Janata Bank shows a point estimate fairly close to 
but still significantly different from one. 
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are positive), whereas joint-production tends to partially 
compensate for this effects in most cases (i.e., the estimate of 
r 12 is negative). This implies that, when evaluated for 
different branch sizes, the ES parameter suggests the existence 
of unexploited economies of scale for small branches, and 
diseconomies of scale in large branches. In other words, the 
average cost surface is U-shaped. · When feasible, therefore, 
banks showing constant returns to scale should attempt to expand 
small branches and contract large branches to make their sizes 
approach the average branch size. 
An interesting finding in Table 1 is that the values of 
partial economies of scale tend to follow the cost shares of 
loans and deposits. Public development banks, devoted primarily 
to lending with little deposit mobilization activity (hence, a 
small share of deposits in total cost~) show the largest 
potential cost advantages to the expansion of deposit 
mobilization (i.e., small values of the partial economies of 
scale parameters). An extreme case is the public development 
bank of the Dominican Republic, which had initiated the provision 
of deposit services only two years before its cost-function was 
estimated (Cuevas and Poyo). The private commercial bank of 
Honduras offers a striking contrast with this pattern, with a 
large share of deposits in total intermediation costs and 
diseconomies of scale to the expansion of deposit activities. An 
important implication of these results is that those banks which 
do not show significant overall economies of scale could benefit 
from "unbalanced" output growth, emphasizing the expansion of the 
financial service with the lowest value of partial economies of 
scale. 
The average costs and marginal costs of lending and deposit 
mobilization for the same eight banks are presented in Table 2. 
Overall, Bangladesh banks show lower average and marginal costs 
than the other banks. The public development bank of Honduras 
displays the highest average costs of lending and deposit 
mobilization. However, the marginal costs of deposit 
mobilization for this bank are substantially lower than the 
corresponding average costs, which is consistent with the partial 
economies of scale results discussed above. 
Two caveats are important in analyzing the findings reported 
in Table 2. First, costs of lending and costs of deposit 
mobilization cannot be simply added to arrive at the overall 
costs of intermediation. Adjustments must be made to account for 
the share of deposits in the total pool of loanable funds. The 
costs of mobilizing other funds (e.g., borrowings from the 
central bank) are likely to be substantially lower, although not 
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necessarily negligible7. Second, low intermediation costs may 
not necessarily reflect efficient overall performance of the 
institution, whereas high intermediation costs may indeed reflect 
wasted resources. This point will be discussed further later in 
this paper. 
The necessary condition for the existence of cost 
complementarities between loans and deposits was met in all but 
two cases (last column of Table 2}. This indicates that the 
marginal cost of lending will decrease with increases in the 
amount of deposits mobilized, and vice versa. This finding 
highlights the advantages of joint production of banking services 
compared to specialization in lending. Furthermore, as 
Srinivasan points out, cost functions capture only the supply-
side benefits of joint production, but are unable to account for 
the benefits it yields to customers. The existence of cost 
complementarities on the supply side only makes institutional 
incentives coincide with socially desirable production 
arrangements. 
The studies reviewed here make an important contribution in 
documenting the magnitudes of elasticities of factor 
substitution, and the price-elasticities of factor demand in 
developing-country banking (see Table 3). With the exception of 
the private commercial bank of Honduras, elasticities of 
capital/labor substitution are rather low, fluctuating between 
0.49 and 0.95 (excluding the extreme case of the Dominican 
Republic). The same contrast is in general true for the price-
elasticities of factor demand, most notably in the demand for 
labor services8 . These findings indicate serious rigidities in 
factor allocation in public development banks and nationalized 
banks, and a weak response to price signals in these 
institutions. 
Investigating the effects of financial regulations and other 
factors likely to affect banks' costs is usually constrained by 
data availability and the lack of appropriate proxies to capture 
the effect of different regulations. Among the studies included 
here, only the Honduras study estimated the cost effects of 
financial regulations (Cuevas, 1984}. It was found that 
7 
8 
Research in progress in the Philippines (Untalan and 
Cuevas) found that more than 6 percent of the costs of 
funds mobilization correspond to borrowings from the 
central bank. This share reaches almost 18 percent in 
banks that rely heavily on rediscount funds. 
For comparison, Murray and White report an elasticity 
of substitution of 1.74 for British Columbia credit 
unions, and demand elasticities similar to those shown 
by the private commercial bank in Table 3. 
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interest-rate ceilings had a significant cost-increasing effect in both the development bank and the private bank. It was also 
documented that recourse to targeted funds from external sources 
(foreign donors and/or the central bank) had a lagged increasing 
effect on the costs of intermediation for the development bank. 
Costs of Lending, Default Risk and Institutional Performance 
The lending costs results of studies undertaken over the 
last four years in six countries are summarized in Table 4. As 
pointed out earlier, the comparison focuses on the non-financial 
costs of loan administration, since costs of funds (interest 
rates) vary substantially (in nominal terms) across countries, 
due to different monetary conditions. Costs associated with 
default (risk premia) are not included in Table 4; however, the 
importance of the default factor when comparing bank performances 
will be discussed later in this section. 
Bangladesh banks show relatively low overall lending costs 
compared to the other case studies reported in Table 4. Even 
though the bank branches used in the Bangladesh case studies are 
primarily rural and agricultural loans predominate in their 
portfolios, average costs of lending fluctuate between 1 percent 
and 4 percent. This cost range is comparable to the average 
figures obtained for non-agricultural loans in other countries, 
which in turn appear substantially lower than agricultural loans. 
Specialized government banks show high loan-administration 
costs in all countries. The rather low administration costs of 
public development banks in the Philippines can be partially 
explained by the large scale of operations of the Philippines 
National Bank (PNB). PNB operations are based on relatively 
large loans to agribusiness and agricultural trade enterprises, a 
factor that may explain the low costs of the Bangladesh Krishi 
Bank (BKB) as well. 
As indicated above, a comparison of (non-interest) lending 
costs across banks of different countries should take into 
account two important factors: first, the overall "degree of 
sophistication" of the banks in question, and second, the 
different performance in loan recovery associated with the 
institutions under analysis. The first factor is clearly 
illustrated by the government development bank of Niger (The 
"Caisse Nationale de Cr dit Agricole") which stands out as a very 
simple credit delivery system. In spite of performing a mere 
input delivery function, and without carrying out essential 
banking procedures of loan evaluation, monitoring and loan 
recovery, this bank shows the high administration costs reported 
in Table 4 (see Cuevas, Graham, and Masini). The case studies in 
the other countries considered here are comparable in the sense 
that basic conventional lending practices are generally followed. 
14 
Whether this is true for loan recovery practices is a question 
that the discussion below will help answer. 
Default risk must be an important consideration in assessing 
institutional performance. To illustrate this point, it is 
convenient to briefly analyze the general expression for (non-
f inancial) lending costs: 
LC = a + r ( 1 1 ) 
where, LC is non-financial per unit lending costs, a is per unit 
loan-administration costs, and r denotes risk premium. In turn, 
risk premium is calculated as: 
r = [d/(1-d)](l+a+f) ( 12) 
where, d is the default rate, and f is the opportunity cost of 
funds (Lee and Baker). The expression (12) summarizes the 
consequences of default, i.e., the loss of principal and 
uncollected interest, the administration costs incurred in 
handling the loans in default, and the opportunity cost of these 
funds. Substituting (12) into (11) allows performing a simple 
exercise with different values of administration costs (a) and 
default rates (d) to generate the diagrams in Figures 1 and 2. 
First, the linear relationship between lending costs and 
administration costs shifts upward and becomes steeper as the 
default rate (d) increases (figure 1). On the other hand, the 
relationship between lending costs and default rate is non-
linear, with lending costs increasing at an increasing rate as a 
function of the default rate (figure 2). The level of 
administration costs is a shift variable in this relationship. 
The foregoing illustrative exercise, however, does not allow 
for potential trade-offs between resources devoted to loan 
processing (i.e., administration costs) and loan-recovery 
performance. This relationship is explored below based on the 
results of the different case studies under analysis. 
Performance in loan recovery appears strikingly different 
across the banks under comparison. Table 5 shows the default 
rates estimated based on the past-due ratios reported in the 
different sources for agricultural loans (column 1) and calcu-
lates the risk premia associated with them assuming a homogeneous 
opportunity cost of funds of 5% (column 3)9. Column 4 in Table 5 
indicates the total agricultural lending costs resulting from 
this exercise, excluding the interest paid on deposits and 
borrowings and the transaction costs of mobilizing these funds. 
9 Loan default is assumed equal to one-fourth the level 
of past-due ratios. This assumption, forced by the 
absence of reliable data on default rates, may bias the 
comparison across case studies. 
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The use of default rates based on past-due ratios needs ·to 
be taken with caution (see also note 9 above). The usual way of 
computing these ratios, i.e. overdue balances over total loans 
outstanding, may bias the comparison across banks if the term 
structure of their loan portfolio is substantially different. 
Furthermore, the larger the share of long-term loans not yet due 
in the portfolio, the larger the downward bias in the measured 
past-due ratio. 
With the foregoing caveats in mind, the last column of 
Table 5 provides a rough comparison across banks and countries 
that encompasses both transaction costs of lending and loan 
recovery performance. Past-due ratios of Bangladesh banks, and 
consequently total non-interest costs, appear visibly higher than 
almost all other banks included in the cross-country comparison. 
The Nationalized commercial banks of Bangladesh, and the public 
development bank of Honduras belong to the highest cost category. 
The public development banks of the Dominican Republic, Togo and 
Niger comprise a second-highest cost category. Rural banks in 
the Philippines, the public development bank of Bangladesh (BKB), 
along with Philippine private development banks fall into an 
intermediate cost category. Finally, private commercial banks 
(in the Philippines and in Honduras) and the public development 
banks of the Philippines belong to the lowest cost group. 
Perhaps the most important implication of the foregoing 
discussion is the need to pay close attention to the measurement 
and reporting of loan recovery performance. The comparison 
presented in Table 5 highlights the incidence of default rates in 
building a comprehensive performance indicator for banks' lending 
activities. An important component of the observed differences 
across banks and countries may be precisely a different 
definition of past-due ratios, and a different correlation of 
this measure with effective loan default losses (see note 9). 
On the other hand, the low cost of loan administration found 
in some banks before considering the risk premi·a associated with 
loan default may indicate an insufficient amount of resources 
allocated to loan evaluation and loan recovery. Hence, loan 
administration expenses appear low in the books, whereas 
effective lending costs are strikingly high due to poor recovery 
performance. This suggests the existence of an important trade-
off between the amount and quality of resources allocated to loan 
processing on the one hand, and loan recovery performance and 
effective lending costs on the other hand. 
Concluding Remarks 
The review of a number of recent studies of banking in 
developing countries has highlighted several features of 
financial intermediation in these economies. The production of 
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financial services displays constant or increasing overall 
returns to scale. Average-cost surfaces were found to be u-
shaped in most cases, and substantial differences were observed 
in the partial economies of scale associated with loans versus 
deposits. Cost complementarities between loans and deposits~ 
exist in the majority of the case studies. These findings 
indicate that potentially cost-decreasing resource reallocations 
exist in developing-country banking. Banks could engage in 
"unbalanced" expansion emphasizing the production of the 
financial service with the lowest cost-increasing effect. The 
results analyzed here show that joint production of financial 
services offers important cost advantages over specialized 
banking. 
The comparison of lending costs in selected case studies in 
six developing countries highlighted the importance of 
considering loan recovery as an integral part of an overall 
indicator of lending performance. Furthermore, the analysis 
emphasizes the need to appropriately measure loan delinquency, 
and to reflect the expected loan default losses in the accounting 
provisions of the institutions. 
Why is it that total lending costs, inclusive of risk costs, 
do not receive more attention from bank managers and policy-
makers? Evidently, as underlined above, the explanation relies 
upon the distinction between the explicit nature of effective 
bank expenses (i.e., cash outlays), which do not include imputed 
costs due to expected loan default, and the economic concept of 
bank costs which does consider the opportunity cost of loan 
losses. While, in the short run, the management may be primarily 
concerned with covering operational expenses, in the medium to 
long term the neglect of loan recovery procedures as well as 
inadequate accounting provisions for loan default inevitably 
result in substantial bank bail-outs and reorganizations. 
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Table 1 
Economies of Scale and Cost Shares of Loans and Deposits 
in Selected Case Studies 
Case Studies Economies of Scale 
Overall Partial 
Loans Deposits 
Bangladesh 
Nationalized 
Commercial Banks 
Agrani 
Jana ta 
Rupali 
Sonali 
Public Development Bank 
Honduras 
Public Development Bank 
Private Commercial Bank 
Doainican Republic 
Public Development Bank 
0.95 
0.90* 
0.98 
* 0.77 
0.66 
1.08 
1.59 
* 
0.51* 
Sources: Bangladesh - Srinivasan, 1988, 
Honduras - Cuevas, 1984, 
0.34 
0.39 
0.36 
0.43 
0.52 
0.77 
0.39 
0.50 
0.61 
0.50 
0.63 
0.34 
0.14 
0.31 
1.20 
0.01 
Dominican Republic - Cuevas and Poyo, 1986. 
* Significantly less than one. 
Cost Shares 
Loans Deposits 
% ____ % 
35.83 
43.80 
36.23 
55.68 
78.29 
71.10 
28.30 
98.05 
64 .17 
56.20 
63.77 
44.32 
21.71 
28.90 
71. 70 
1.95 
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Table 2 
Costs of Lending, Costs of Mobilizi~g Deposits and 
Cost Complementarities in Selected Case Studies 
Case Studies Cost of Lending Cost of Deposit Cost Comple-
Mobilization mentarity 
Average Marginal Average Marginal (condition)a 
% % % % 
Bangladesh 
Nationalized 
Commercial Banks 
Agrani 3.56 1. 21 3.90 2.37 -0.04 
Jana ta 3.02 1.19 2.46 1.24 0.01 
Rupali 3.78 1.35 2.41 1. 51 0.85 
Sonali 1. 96 0.84 1. 29 0.44 -0.02 
Public Development Bank 0.89 0.46 2.33 0.34 -0.02 
Honduras 
Public Development Bank 10.02 7.64 8.78 2.72 -0.44 
Private Commercial Bank 3.39 1. 69 5.33 6.71 -0.87 
Dominican Republic 
Public Development Bank 8.81 4.43 9.11 0.09 -0.04 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
a A negative sign indicates that the necessary condition for cost 
complementarities is met. 
Case Studies 
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Table 3 
Elasticities of Factor Stbstitution and Price-Elasticities 
of Factor remand in Selected Case Sttrlies 
Price-elasticities of delllllll 
for factors of prodtEtion 
Elasticity of 
capital/laoor 
substitution laoor/laoor laoor/capital capital/lal.X>r capital/capital 
~adesh 
Nationalized 
C<Jnnercial Banks 
Agrani 0.91 -0.53 0.53 0.38 -0.38 
Janata 0.57 -0.31 0.31 0.26 -0.26 
Ru[Xllj 0.49 -0.28 0.28 0.21 -0.21 
Sonali 0.95 -0.30 0.30 0.65 -0.65 
Public Developnent Bank 0.79 -0.15 0.15 0.64 -0.64 
lbDras 
Public Developnent Bank 0.63 -0.45 0.45 0.18 -0.18 
Private Conmercial Bank 1.24 -0.87 0.87 0.37 -0.37 
Dali.nican Repj>lic 
Public Developnent Bank 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.04 
Sources: sare as Table 1. 
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TABLE 4 
Costs of Loan Administration Estimated in Selected case Stuiies 
for Agricultural and J.lbn-Agricultural Loans. Average.Costs 
in Percent of the Loan Anmnt, by Type of Loan 
Ncn-Agr. 
case Stuiies Agr. Loans Loans All Loans 
% % % 
eaq;adesh.'Y Nationalized Conmercial 
Banks (~ighted average) 2.9 
Public Developnent Bank (BKB) 0.9 
AliliA>ines A. 1oos!Y 
Public Developnent 
Banks (~ighted average) 4.2 2.7 
Private Conmercial Banks· 1.6 2.7 
Rural Banks 5.4 3.9 
B. 1oos£1 
Private Developnent Banks 5.3 
Private Conmercial Banks 4.3 
Rural Banks 4.8 
~ Public Developnent Bank 10.0 
Private Conmercial Bank 3.7-8.4£/ 1.0-7.~ 3.4 
lblin.icao Replbl.ic Public Developnent ~_/ 9.3 n.a. 9.3 
Public ~velopient ~ 8.8 n.a. 8.8 
Public Developnent Bank 5.3 
Niger.ii Public Developnent Bank 9.5 n.a. 9.5 
Footnotes on next rage. 
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TABLE 4 
Footnotes 
~I Srinivasan, 1988. Data base: branch-level records 1983-
1984. Weighted averages calculated by the author using the 
outstanding loan balances for each bank reported by 
Srinivasan. 
Q/ TBAC, August 1985. Data base: banks' financial statements 
1983. Weighted averages calculated using the shares in 
total loans granted in 1983. 
~/ Untalan and Cuevas, 1988. Data base: branch-level records 
and field survey, 1987. 
g/ Cuevas, 1984. Data base: branch-level records 1970-1982. 
~I Cuevas and Graham, 1984. Data base: branch-level records 
1982, and field survey, 1983. Highest cost of agricultural 
loans correspond to foreign-funded supervised loans. 
11 Cuevas and Poyo, 1986. Data base: branch-level records 
1979-1983. 
g/ Cuevas and Poyo, 1986. Data base: branch-level records 
1984-1985. Deposit mobilization activity started in 1984. 
hi Cuevas, 1987a. Data base: bank records, 1985. 
j/ Cuevas, 1987b. Data base: field surveys, household level 
(1985) and branch level (1986). 
n.a. not applicable 
• 
/ 
Case Sttrlies 
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TAPLE 5 
Cross-comtry Ganµ:i.rison of l'bn-Interest Agricultural Leming Costs 
Incltrling Risk Prenia 
(1) (2) (3) 
~fault Loan Risk 
rat& Admin. PremiaW 
Costs 
(4) 
Total l'bn-
Interest 
Costs {2+3) 
----------------------- % -------- % ------- % -------- % --
Bmvladesh Nationalized Conmercial 
Bani<s (weighted average) 13.3 
Public Develo1111ent Bank {BKB) 7.3 
Aliliwines A. 1983 
Public Develo1111ent 
Bani<s {weighted average)£/ 1.8 
Private Garu!Ercial &mks 2.5 
Rural Bani<s 5.8 
B. 1988 
Private Develo1111ent Bani<s 2.5 
Private Conmercial Bani<s 2.5 
Rural Bani<s 5.8 
amuras Public Develo1111ent Bank 8.8 
Private Conmercial Bank 1.3 
lblinican Replblic Public Develo1111ent BankQ/ 7.0 
Togo Public Develo1111ent Bank 9.8 
Niger Public Develo1111ent Bank 4.5 
Sources: Sane as Table 1. 
£!/ Assumed eqm1 to one-fourth of the reported past-doo ratios . 
.QI Conputed using the fornula 
r = (d/(1-d))(l+a+f) 
where, r is the risk preniun 
d is the default rate 
a is the loan crJministration cost 
2.9 
0.9 
4.2 
1.6 
5.4 
5.3 
4.3 
4.8 
10.0 
3.4 
8.8 
5.3 
9.5 
f is the opp:>rtwtlty cost of fun:is, assumed 5% for all cases. 
16.5 19.4 
8.3 9.2 
1.9 6.1 
2.7 4.3 
6.7 12.1 
2.8 8.1 
2.8 7.1 
6.7 11.5 
11.0 21.0 
1.4 4.8 
8.6 17.4 
11.9 17.2 
5.4 14.9 
s;_/ Default rate corresponds to the Philippine National Bank (FNB) am the Develo1111ent Bank of the 
Philippines {DBP) taken together {see note a/ aoove on default rates). 
gJ Only mcst recent study considered for this table. 
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Figure 1 
Lending Costs and Administration Costs 
for Different Default Rates (d) 
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Figure 2 
Lending Costs and Default Rates 
for Different Administration Costa (a) 
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APPENDIX TABLE 
Case Studies: Selected Indicators of Countries Involved 
GDP per capita M2 I GDP Po:pilation per 
Country 1905, ussa % bank branchb 
( '000 inhab.) 
Bargladesh 144 27.3 25 
Philippines 616 22.6C 13 
Honduras 790 30.ti 15 
Daninican Re:piblic 725 23.-id 7 
Togo 248 45.4 52 
Niger 270 15.3 250 
Sources: IMF, Internaticmal Financial Statistics. Niger figures from 
CUevas, Garlos E., "Rural Finance Profile of Niger", 1986. 
Togo figures fran CUevas, carlos E., "Rural Finance Profile of 
Togo", 1987. Po:pilation per bank branch fran the author's 
notes and miscellaneous country studies. 
a Exchange rate conversion. 
b Includes branches of other (non-bank) financial institutions, but does 
not include post-office savings offices. 
c Includes developnent banks arrl savings banks. 
d Includes deposits in other financial institutions (line 45 in the IFS 
bulletin). 
